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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional notions and rules of professionalism in the legal pro-
fession have been premised on particular conceptions of the lawyer's
role, usually as an advocate,' occasionally as a counselor, advisor,
transaction planner, government official, decision maker and in the
recent parlance of one of this symposium's participants-a "states-
man [sic]. '"2 As we examine what professionalism means and what
rules should be used to regulate its activity, it is important to ask
some foundational questions: For what ends should our profession be
used? What does law offer society? How should lawyers exercise their
particular skills and competencies?
While it is true that the lawyer is an advocate and uses her skills
to persuade others on behalf of her client-her principal-lawyers
are also "officers of the court" with loyalties and allegiances to the
public good, and sometimes, its agencies. As others have elaborated,
lawyers have duties to practice justice.3 And, we have heard much in
this symposium, as well as in modern professional discourse, about
the tensions between the paradigms of "law as a profession" and "law
as a business. '4
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Chair, CPR-Institute
for Dispute Resolution-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR. Thanks
to Professor Jeff Stempel for the invitation to return to Florida State University College of
Law and to the other symposium participants for stimulating thoughts and comments.
1. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Is-
sues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of La wyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX.
L. REV. 407 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion]; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997) [herein-
after Menkel Meadow, Silences of the Restatement].
2. ANTHONY KRONmAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1994).
3. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xvii, xxii (1988); see
also WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 12 (1998)
(suggesting that ethical rules are one way to "alleviate the moral anxiety" of lawyers).
4. See Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership,
and the Law-As-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Pearce,
Law Day 2051. The profession-business tension has been with us since at least the early
18th century, though some would claim the rhetoric about different masters as justice or
manna has been with us since the beginning of American legal history. See LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1985).
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I want to suggest, as I have before,5 that lawyers serve other func-
tions as well and that our rules of professionalism do not adequately
reflect some of these other functions-the lawyer as problem solver,6
peacemaker 7 and third party neutral, as some examples. Too much of
the debate about professionalism, it seems to me, has been clustered
around a series of false dichotomies or polarizations--business ver-
sus profession, client defense (zeal) versus truth, adversarialism ver-
sus compromise, criminal versus civil, public versus private, client
service and autonomy vs. justice, individualism vs. system, rules of
law and discretion-as if our actual practices do not often combine
aspects of these claimed opposites simultaneously.
Law is a profession and clearly is concerned with, and suffering
from, market competition and other economic influences. Lawyers
simultaneously serve their clients and have duties and obligations to
the profession itself and to the larger society and its public agencies.
Lawyers often serve clients in adversarial settings like litigation or
contested transactional negotiations, but they also serve clients in
non-adversarial roles where there is no adversary at all (will draft-
ing, business advice) or even serve people as lawyers without having
them in formal client relationships (serving on boards of directors,
acting as mediators, facilitators or consensus builders)." There are no
easy stopping points along many of these continua.
To the extent that lawyers and legal academics have an obligation
to diagnose, solve and reform legal issues, it seems imperative that
we take account of the complexity of lawyer roles and not use simple
"paradigms" to obscure more functional complexity. As a former prac-
ticing lawyer and a long-time ethics teacher, I have questioned the
desirability of transsubstantivity in both ethical and procedural
rules,9 when functional specificity may be required for more clarity of
5. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem Solving Pedagogy Seriously, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: In-
tegrating ADR in the Law School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REV. 1995 (1993); Carrie Men-
kel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solv-
ing, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another Vlew].
6. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Art and Science ofProblem-Solving Negotiation,
TRIAL, June, 1999 at 48; Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 5.
7. It was Abraham Lincoln, that consummate advocate, who exhorted his profession
to: "discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point
out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of
time. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There
will still be business enough [sic]." Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture,
in THE COLLECTIVE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, 18-19 (Roy Ba-
sler ed., 1974). In the original speech he said "never encourage" rather than "discourage"
litigation.
8. See CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (Larry Susskind ed., 1999).
9. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); see also Eleanor Myers, "Simple
Truths"About Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (1996).
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role, guidance necessary for professional actors and clearer state-
ments of purpose for the consumer of such services. Though profes-
sions often desire general rules of ethics to unify and mark the
boundaries of what a profession is, increasingly, general ethics and
professionalism may be so general and abstract as to be of little use
both to those who need to act as professionals, with guidance from
appropriate rules and standards, and to those who need to judge the
actions of professionals-both consumers and regulators of various
kinds. 10 To the extent that we too narrowly define the frame or prism
through which we define lawyers' roles, we may be providing inade-
quate ethical guidance for lawyers and too narrowly crafting what
services lawyers can provide. In short, this is an argument for func-
tional ethics, recognizing a broader set of functions for the lawyer in
some non-adversarial settings than current conceptions of ethics or
professionalism seem to want to recognize.
For some, lawyers are the servants of a system that utilizes "the
rule of law" to restrain what might be the despotic or corrupt rule of
particular individuals. Lawyers are thus agents of a particular sys-
tem that has its own justification. David Luban, for example, has ex-
amined whether the lawyer's activities as an advocate in an adver-
sary system can be justified by the defense of the larger system in
which the lawyer is located-the adversary system.12 Others have
framed the lawyer's role in different ways: the "transaction cost en-
gineer,"'3 the "process architect,"' 4 the purveyor of justice or officer of
the court 5 with "referential" ethical responsibility placed in the "re-
putationar' market (for transactional work) or a jurisprudential or
10. In general, regulation of professionals has itself become more complex, including,
for the legal profession, disciplinary bodies in the states, court decisions through disquali-
fication, sanction and withdrawal motions, federal agencies' with their own rules of admis-
sion and practice (IRS and SEC, as examples), and increasingly, the transdisciplinary ac-
tions of professional associations that either certify or hope to regulate best practices in
some professional fields, such as mediation or paralegals. See, e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR,
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1995); L. Ray Patterson, LAWYER'S LAW:
PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND DISCIPLINARY ISSUES (4th ed. 1999).
11. In this essay I am principally concerned with lawyers' roles in dispute resolution
and what I call "transactional ADR," but there are many other related issues of other func-
tions to be performed by lawyers currently being addressed by the ABA Commission on
Multi-Disciplinary Practice. See Report (visited June 9, 1999)
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html> (suggesting Model Rule revisions to permit,
with certain rules and regulations, multi-disciplinary practice of lawyers with nonlawyers
and allowing fee-splitting with other non-legal professionals; see also Ritchenya Shepard,
Lawyers, Accountants and Beyond, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A-1.
12. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1984).
13. Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
ing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 244 (1984).
14. ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING: HOW LAWYERS HELP CLIENTS CREATE
VALUE IN NEGOTIATION (forthcoming).
15. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 9.
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legalistic definition of "systemic" justice (for litigation). To the extent
that lawyers serve different functions, with their particular expertise
located in different process functions, it may be that ethics will have
to be specifically related to function and form of the activity within
specific and, perhaps, different institutional settings.16
In a recent book examining adversarial ethics (and finding them
wanting), Arthur Isak Applbaum acknowledges the ethics of profes-
sional function (and suggests these can go too far) by recounting the
ability of Charles-Henri Sanson in maintaining his position as Exe-
cutioner of Paris through changes in regime from Louis XVI through
all the stages of the French Revolution, because of his extreme pro-
fessional and functional ethics"7 -he was simply a professional exe-
cutioner and the underlying political regime for whom he did his
work did not matter. 8 What did matter was how and with what pro-
fessional standards of quality he performed his work. I want to sug-
gest the danger of Sanson's success-the assumption in our own code
of legal ethics, that a lawyer is a lawyer and that all lawyers can be
regulated, by the same rules, regardless of how or for whom they per-
form their services.
Though the analogy is not totally apt, Sanson's ethics as an Exe-
cutioner transcending political regime is a bit like the expectation of
our current ethical codes-that a lawyer can be governed by a uni-
tary code as long as he is called a "lawyer," regardless of whether his
"political regime" is the adversarial world of advocacy or not. Some
have suggested that we can avoid these problems by claiming that a
lawyer who performs non-adversarial roles, like arbitrator-judge or
mediator, is simply not acting as a lawyer.1 9 However, I have argued
16. I have often thought of Lon Fuller as the "jurisprude" of ADR. His series of arti-
cles discusses the particular structures and competencies of adjudication, arbitration and
mediation as different legal processes. In the debates about ADR, the 1950s Legal Process
school's insights about "institutional competence" continue, suggesting that different forms
and institutions within the legal system may also require different ethical systems. See
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 415-21, 417
n.41; see also David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
801, 807 (1998).
17. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES
IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
18. This extreme form of "functional" professional ethics is also examined in Kazuo
Ishiguro's novel, REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989). See Rob Atkinson, How the Butler was Made
to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of the Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J. 177
(1995); see also David Luban, Stevens's Professionalism and Ours, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
297 (1996).
19. See Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice ofLaw4 NIDR FORUM, June 1997; see
also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. When ADR Is Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must
Confront Conflicts Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147 (1994); Bruce Meyer-
son, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG.
74 (1996); Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw,
15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 94 (1997); NJ Panel Finds ADR Is Part of Law
Practice, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 87 (1994).
[Vol. 27:153
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otherwise, suggesting that such roles do implicate the use of law and
its "practice" in the reliance third parties may place on legal inter-
pretations, even if they are not clients.20
Though the adversary system is both defended and found wanting
for its claim that it is the best method for learning the truth,2 1 or, al-
ternatively, for protecting individual rights,2 2 or, because when com-
pared with various alternatives, it is considered the fairest by par-
ticipants,2 other forms of legal and non-legal problem solving are
growing in importance because they emphasize other values. A re-
cent reform effort in the United Kingdom, for example, has borrowed
aspects of the continental inquisitorial system by using single, court-
appointed experts to reduce adversarialism among competing and
"bought" experts and is suggesting court-structured fee schedules
(borrowed from Germany) to add predictability and, presumably, ac-
cess to legal services . 2
4
As Bill Simon recently demonstrated so eloquently, even the eth-
ics of the adversary system are self-contradictory, or, in the old words
of critical legal studies, "indeterminate" because the guiding ethical
concepts of the "zealous advocate" limited by the "bounds of the law"
are often either in tension with each other or have no clear lines of
demarcation.2 5 Furthermore, as Simon and others have argued, in
our current legal culture, the "zear' of the advocate for his client has
trumped whatever "supplementary" values are intended to be ex-
pressed in the duties of the "officer of the court" who has responsibili-
ties to the larger system of justice. 6
Even the notion of "officer of the court" as an ethical counterpoint
to consider the justice or fairness of one's acts as a zealous advocate
falls far short of today's law practice realities. If taken literally, the
lawyer's duty to be an officer "of the court," intending to connote
20. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice ofLa w 14 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 57 (1996); see also To the Editors: Is Mediation the Practice of Law
Redux, NIDR NEWS, Nov. 1997-Jan. 1998, at 1 (1998).
21. See LUBAN, sup-a note 3, at 68-74; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN
JUSTICE (1980); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5-6 (1996) (providing a cri-
tique of the adversary system and its binary nature) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Trou.
ble].
22. See Monroe Freedman, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 16 (1990); Monroe
Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63 (1996).
23. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); see also John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Deci-
sionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 386-88 (1972) (discussing research that appears to sup-
port the validity of an adversarial model).
24. See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report, REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (July 1996).
25. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 7-8.
26. See id. at 9-10 (arguing for a discretionary approach to lawyering that considers a
wide range of circumstances "to promote justice").
1999]
158 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 27:153
some loyalty to the system, beyond the client's demands, would seem
to apply to those matters in litigation, or at least those in anticipa-
tion of litigation.2 ' How should the lawyer's duty to the system be ex-
pressed for non-court lawyer activities-the lawyer as counselor, will
drafter, negotiator, or, in the major role which is my theme here, as
third party neutral?28 The lawyer is not always an officer of the court
when performing legal tasks; thus, the reference point for profes-
sionalism and ethics must be something beyond the lawyer's duty to
a tribunal or specific office, whether located in a specific institution
or within the more generalized institution of litigation.
I have written at length elsewhere that the adversarial system,
though serving some functions, is potentially deficient in meeting
some human goals. 29 To the extent that the structure of adversarial-
ism privileges argument, debate, bipolar or binary solutions and of-
ten channels disputes or issues into simplistic two-sided treatment,
this stylized form prevents recognition of the more common ways in
which legal problems occur in our modern world. Even conventional
lawsuits these days are often disputes or issues between and among
multiple parties (i.e. environmental clean-ups, mass torts, securities,
reform of governmental entities, consumer actions), often with mul-
tiple issues at stake-what Lon Fuller called "multi-plex" disputes,
which are not susceptible to litigious on/off, yes/no solutions.30 These
kinds of cases may require complex solutions, with future-oriented
rules, transactions or duties and cannot adequately be served by the
"limited remedial imaginations" of courts. 31
Some lawyers represent entities, either from within or without,
and must manage internal organizational or "constituency" prob-
27. For those cases that are actually filed, we know that over 90% are resolved with-
out trial in court. This does not mean, as many continue to suggest, that 90% of cases set-
tle. Many, in fact, are resolved by judicial decision or other means (motions for summary
judgment, etc.). See Herbert Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70
JUDICATURE 161, 161 (1986). Of course, "officer of the court" also implicates the complex
ethical dispute about when lawyers as advisors (particularly in regulatory advice giving)
are acting on the basis of "anticipation" of litigation, as became an issue in the Lincoln
Savings and Loan disciplinary charges. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Fie, in REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 729, 731 (1992).
28. I have continually raised the issue of whether a lawyer appearing in a private
mediation, arbitration, or in a court-annexed program is appearing before a "tribunal" as
defined in the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduc4 or, now, in the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra
note 1; see also Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
29. See Menkel-Meadow, Trouble, supra note 21.
30. Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 306-07
(1971).
31. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 5 (suggesting that courts have
limited remedial imaginations, not because judges are not imaginative, but because com-
mon law and statutes and the very structure of the legal system limit what courts are al-
lowed to do and what solutions they are allowed to see).
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lems 32 as a matter of advice and counsel, whether or not there are
particular legal disputes with the outside world. Modern in-house
counsel or ombudsman-like lawyers may deal as much with internal
organizational issues and management than with outside disputes,
calling for very different skills and approaches to legal problem solv-
ing.13 Other lawyers are engaged to help individuals or entities form
organizations or partnerships, draft wills or contracts, and may or
may not have "issues" or "adversaries" in the way the adversarial
model of lawyering understands them.
If finding the truth, learning what happened in the past, and pro-
tecting individual rights are not the only values a legal system
should express, then perhaps we need to recast the goals that law-
yers and the legal system might seek to achieve. Furthermore, we
might need to rethink the rules that are intended to guide and regu-
late lawyers seeking to achieve those different goals. What if, for ex-
ample, we saw lawyers and the legal system seeking to solve not only
client problems, but also seeking to work on community-based or
even larger social problems? What if needs, as well as rights, were
part of the lawyer's vocabulary? Notions of loyalty would be different.
So, would there need to be different rules regarding confidentiality?
If, as in other cultures, we began to value harmony 4 and peace, as
much as contention and rights, lawyers seeking to reduce, rather
than increase, conflict might have to operate in different ways.
If, as I suggested some years ago, and which is now becoming a
more popular notion with many, including the Attorney General, 35 we
considered the lawyer as problem-solver, then lawyers would engage
in forward-thinking, planning and preventative strategies, as well as
retrospective defenses and claims. What should the defense lawyer's
responsibilities be to the criminal defendant who has been success-
fully defended-acquitted-but who might in fact be guilty? What
should the lawyer's responsibility be to prevent future crimes, includ-
ing not just the commonly mentioned individual crimes of burglary,
etc., but corporate crimes of pollution, unfair trade practices, inhu-
mane employment policies? What responsibility should a prosecutor
feel for the conviction he achieves when he knows the defendant is
32. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978) (discuss-
ing complex duties of lawyers to organizations); DAVID MURRAY, ETHICS IN
ORGANIZATIONS: VALUES, CODES, VISION, STRATEGIES, ACTION (1997).
33. See Ellen Waxman & Howard Gadlin, A BreedApart: An Ombudsman Serves as a
Buffer Between and Among Individuals and Large Institutions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Sum-
mer 1998, at 21.
34. For a trenchant critique of "false" harmony values in our mediation culture, see
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993).
35. See Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1999).
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headed for a prison system that will educate him in new ways of
committing crimes?36 What responsibility should a lawyer feel for the
community when he has won a zoning variance or tax relief for a de-
veloper? These examples suggest that there might be commitments
beyond the client when the lawyer's own actions or work allow the
client to do things that affect others. Our current rules recognize that
lawyers may be ethically liable when their actions have been impli-
cated in their clients' fraudulent acts.3 7 To the extent that lawyers'
actions cause harm to others, what responsibilities should the lawyer
have for preventing or resolving such problems before they occur?
What if every law student and lawyer asked at the beginning of
every traditional case: What caused this dilemma? This problem? Is
the dispute just the tip of an iceberg where the whole iceberg needs
melting? What is the larger context in which this problem is situ-
ated? What would need to be done to fix the problem or to address
the concerns of the parties and those affected by whatever decisions
might be made? This more pro-active approach to legal problem solv-
ing would involve the lawyer in different functions and tasks than
those now often employed within traditional legal paradigms and
skills. Problem solving and mediation literature commonly speak of
lawyers who define problems narrowly (dispute resolvers or litiga-
tors) and those who seek broader issue definition for broader problem
resolution. 38 Should one's ethical duties be commensurate with the
size of the problem or responsibilities that one takes on?
39
Lawyers, for example, might be instrumental in convening meet-
ings of interested groups 40 seeking to resolve issues before, during, or
after lawsuits, using very different techniques than traditional ad-
versarial approaches. In a variety of complex disputes, including
block grant allocation, environmental clean up and siting, municipal
funding and governance, racial tensions, police accountability and
reorganizations of human services agencies, new kinds of processes,
variously called "consensus building,"4' strategic planning, joint prob-
36. See Robert Suro, Law & Order: Counting Toward 100,000 More Police, WASH.
POST, June 1, 1999, at A-13 (excerpting Janet Reno's graduation speech to Tulane Law
School).
37. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rules 1.2, 1.G, 3.3, 4.1 (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
38. See, e.g., Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and
Techniques, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 13 (1996) (providing a grid for categorizing
types of mediation).
39. For example, Judith Maute has argued that mediators should bear greater ethical
responsibility when they "preside" over cases where parties are not represented. See Ju-
dith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 508 (1991).
40. See Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1
(1982) (discussing the role lawyers might play in negotiations concerning administrative
procedure); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
41. See, e.g., CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 8.
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lem solving, community education, 4 public conversations 43 and meet-
ing facilitation, 44 have been used by lawyers and others to facilitate
new forms of problem solving with multiple parties and interested
stakeholders. These new processes may very well need new kinds of
rules or expectations about their own ethics and professionalism,
where service is to groups of people who are not "clients" in the
strictly legal or adversarial sense. Duties to explain the legal signifi-
cance of these processes clearly, to treat confidentiality differently, to
be accountable to various affected parties, 45 and to be neutral and
unbiased may take on different meanings in these new contexts.
Even within more traditional lawyer roles, the current rules must
respond to the many ways in which lawyers are intersecting with
less conventional forms of legal process. Some states have already
recognized the new ethical obligation of the lawyer to advise and
counsel the client about other means for resolving problems beyond
the obvious choice of litigation. Colorado and Georgia, for example,
have required lawyers to discuss alternative processes with clients,46
and now, many courts, especially those with mandatory ADR pro-
grams, may require such counseling as a matter of procedural, rather
than ethical mandates. If the lawyer's responsibilities are to help cli-
ents, and possibly others, achieve their legitimate ends, then advice
about the most effective and efficient way to achieve those goals
would seem to be an obvious and integral part of the lawyer's obliga-
tions.
To the extent that lawyers may interact more directly, either with
represented, or even with unrepresented parties,47 what obligations
ought lawyers to have in dealing directly with parties who are not
their own clients?"
42. See Ingrid Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New Vision ofLegal Services
Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 433 (1998).
43. See, e.g., Symposium, Innovations in Process: New Applications for ADR, DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 1.
44. See ROGER SCHWARZ, THE SKILLED FACILITATOR: PRACTICAL WISDOM FOR
DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE GROUPS (1994).
45. See, e.g., Larry Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Prob-
lem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). But see Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Media-
tion: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).
46. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1992); GA. R.
CIV. P. Rule EC7-5; see also Art Garwin, Show Me the Offer, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 84;
Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof. and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. RI-255 & RI-262; Kan-
sas Bar Assoc. Comm. on Ethics-Advisory Services, Op. 94-01; Pennsylvania Bar Assoc.
Ethics, Op. 90-125.
47. See Russell Engler, Out ofSight and Out ofLine: The Need for Regulation of La w-
yers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 81-82 (1997)
(arguing that more enforcement and clarification of Model Rule 4.3 and Model Rule DR 7-
104(A)(2) is needed when lawyers act adversarily with those who are unrepresented and
cannot protect themselves).
48. A growing body of law is taking on the question of what responsibilities and li-
abilities lawyers may have to third parties who are not their clients, but who may rely on
1999]
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In exploring the lawyer's role as "peacemaker," my principal con-
cern here, I want to focus on the role that lawyers play when they as-
sist parties in resolving disputes outside of court or utilize new forms
of appropriate dispute resolution, even in transactional work, or
"transactional ADR," as I have come to call it. Our conventional rules
of ethics are particularly inapposite when lawyers serve in quasi-
judicial roles as arbitrators, 49 or as mediators, facilitating negotia-
tions among and between parties, but not deciding anything. Third
party neutrals, like mediators and consensus-building facilitators,
seldom decide cases or "find" facts. Such people are trained to probe
for parties' underlying needs and interests and to focus on commonal-
ities as well as differences. Rather than focusing on aggressive per-
suasiveness, third party neutrals ask parties and their lawyers to
use creativity, patience, persistence, flexibility and resilience, with-
out rigid or premature closure on a problem. Some processes are par-
ticular to the forms-caucuses and other separate meetings with par-
ties and stakeholders look like ex parte contacts, which would ordi-
narily be prohibited by traditional rules of legal ethics, but, in these
contexts, separate meetings are often contracted for, though perhaps
still require some ethical regulation5 like requiring disclosure of
practices and clarity regarding confidentiality obligations.5
Many mediators and facilitators seek to involve all "stakeholders,"
like insurers or relevant community members, even when they are
not formally part of a lawsuit, thus complicating the layers of in-
volvement lawyers may have with different participants. Mediation
and other less adversarial problem-solving techniques produce dif-
ferent outcomes. For example, the outcomes may be provisional and
dynamic, rather than decided and static and may require continuous
monitoring and continuing relations with the parties.
their work or representations. See, e.g., Symposium, The Lawyer's Duties and Labilties to
Third Parties, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 957 (1996).
49. Many think that the Judicial Code of Conduct can be used as a benchmark for
ethical standards and professionalism in situations where lawyers play adjudicative roles.
I do not agree, since the judge has a permanent role, which allows him to be at arms length
from parties on a regular basis. Arbitrators who may depend on parties choosing and pay-
ing them may be closer to lawyers seeking clients in some respects, while resembling
judges in others. The American Arbitration Association has promulgated several ethics
codes for arbitrators, taking account of the different subject matters in which they operate.
See, e.g., ETHICAL RULES FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS (1977) (now under revision);
ETHICAL RULES FOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATORS.
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 109 (1994).
51. Some sophisticated states now statutorily regulate matters like confidentiality in
mediation. See NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE (2d
ed. 1994). The current draft of a proposed Uniform Mediation Act being considered by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws deals with some of these is-
sues as substantive regulatory matters. See Richard C. Reuben & Nancy Rogers, Uniform
Mediation Act Goes Public for Comments, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1999, at 18-19.
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Lawyers also perform different functions as "representatives" in
these other processes. Several commentators have suggested that be-
cause lawyers' roles in these settings are so different, these alterna-
tive techniques require new rules and different terminology.52 In
part, because of the increased use of "warmer"5 3 dispute resolution
techniques, we are beginning to reexamine what the appropriate
level of candor should be between lawyers in both private negotiation
settings and in certain ADR settings.5 ' If the ethical reference point
is "solving the problem", "doing justice" or even "achieving Pareto
optimal solutions" rather than winning, zeal, or the "adversary
system excuse," then we will have to consider the opposing side more
as a "joint venturer" than an adversary. Furthermore, we may be in
many settings where there is no adversary at all, or where
adversarialism may shift from time to time, in all its postmodern
glory, with coalitions concentrating on different issues within a
transaction or dispute.5 Lawyers would be called on to facilitate,
create and synthesize, as well as to analyze, argue and criticize.
Learning to "think out of the box" and be creative about solutions
would be contradictory to the conventional lawyer's approach-
simply looking for the best precedent.
As these new roles for lawyers proliferate, new ethical issues arise
for which there are no clear answers. Some suggest it is too early to
crystallize these new forms of practice and rigidify them with rules
or regulations, or use professional regulation to act as a gatekeeper
to a new profession with many possible disciplinary homes. While I
52. See, e.g., Roger Fisher, What about Negotiation as a Specialty 69 A.B.A. J. 1221
(1983) (advocating negotiation as specialization, apart from strategical litigation tech-
niques); Robert W. Rack, Jr. Settie or Withdraw: Collaborative Lawyering Provides Incen-
tives to Avoid Costly Litigation, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1998, at 8 (discussing a new
trend toward "collaborative lawyering" in which lawyers and clients enter contractual
agreements to "negotiate in good faith until an agreement is found").
53. David Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 205 (1978).
54. See Philip Schrag & Lisa Lerman, Testimony Before Ethics Commission 2000,
(June 4, 1999). In the last attempt to change the ethics rules, there were proposals to make
candor a process requirement of negotiation and "conscionability" a substantive require-
ment. See MODEL RULES Rules 4.2, 4.3 (Discussion Draft 1983). In this era scholars de-
bated whether candor and a standard of preventing "unconscionability" in lawyer-assisted
negotiations were enforceable in arenas of totally private behavior. See Murray Schwartz,
The Professionalism and Accountability ofLawyers, 66 CALL. REV. 669, 682-83 (1978); see
also James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Ljing in Negotia-
tions, 1980 AM. B. FouND REs. J. 926, 927-28 (arguing that ethical norms may be violated
more readily in negotiation setting because of the private nature of the parties' interac-
tions). For a more modern view of the self-enforcing market in reputational ethics see El-
eanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501
(1989) (arguing that a "functionalist" approach to bargaining produces ethical behavior by
making negotiation reputation more public).
55. See Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 243, 250 (1994) 'Coalition formation occurs when parties negotiate an alli-
ance agreement, formally or informally, expressly or tacitly.").
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am sympathetic to these arguments and have long supported flexibil-
ity in developing these creative approaches to problem solving, we
simply cannot ignore the numerous professionalism issues surround-
ing this new area of practice.
First, a lawyer engaging in these kinds of non- or less- adversarial
situations56 is still disciplinable as a lawyer for the things she does in
any setting if the conduct violates the applicable lawyer disciplinary
rules. 57 Besides lawyer ethics codes, there are pesky questions of po-
tential legal malpractice liability. So far, I am not aware of any re-
ported case in which a lawyer has been held liable for mediator mal-
practice; however, I have heard of unreported settlements. Liability
coverage is now being underwritten for mediator malpractice, and
there are reported cases of unsuccessful efforts to hold lawyers liable
for their actions as third party neutrals. 58
The proliferation of ethics codes and standards by a variety of
third party neutral professional associations 9 makes clear that those
who practice these forms of problem solving, professional facilitation,
and "neutraling" see a need to professionalize by having standards
and exerting some form of quality control over those who perform
such services. Though such efforts are often criticized as market con-
trol projects, most of these organizations have active ethics commit-
tees that hear complaints from consumers and also attempt to de-
velop "best practices" standards.
Furthermore, ADR practitioners are actively seeking ethical guid-
ance when faced with the complex ethical issues confronting third
party neutrals, parties themselves and their representatives in these
processes. I have canvassed most of these issues at length else-
56. One must remember that many of these alternative processes have their adver-
sarial components. Presentations by representatives in arbitration are as adversary as any
activity that lawyers engage in, and even mediation presentations have become increas-
ingly adversarial, opportunistic and gaming over time as experienced lawyer-advocates be-
come party representatives and mediators. See Gail Cox, Arbitration is No Simple Matter,
NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1999, at Al; BENNETT PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE; A
HANDBOOK FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES (1998) (providing guidance to practitioners
in an increasingly more formal area of legal work); CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, MEDIATOR'S DESKBOOK (K. Scanlon ed., 1999) (same).
57. Such rules might include confidentiality rules, contacts with unrepresented par-
ties, fees, advertising, and practicing with nonlawyers or others.
58. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981) (involving an attempt to
sue mediator for malpractice); see also Wagshall v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1251 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (involving suit against mediator and holding that while acting as court-appointed
mediator and performing within the scope of duty, mediators enjoy immunity from dam-
ages); Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843. 848 (1990); Meyers v. Contra Costa
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally Arthur
A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 731
(1984) (discussing several theories of liability and advocating a "fiduciary duties approach"
to address mediator misconduct).
59. For example, the American Arbitration Association, the Academy of Family Me-
diators, and the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution are such associations.
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where, 0 but they include such formal, rule-based issues as conflicts
of interests, 61 fees,6 1 confidentiality and disclosures of harm,63 neu-
trality and impartiality, competence, aiding unauthorized practice
and relevant duties of candor and disclosure, as well as good faith
participation in both private (contractual) and public (court-
sponsored or ordered) proceedings.6 4 And, if a lawyer has a duty to
correct a fraud on the court under Model Rule 3.3, should a mediator
have to correct known perjurious or fraudulent testimony in a later
proceeding on the same matter if the mediator knows the informa-
tion is false?65
Beyond the more formalistic ethical dilemmas are other practice
issues such as what the mediator should do when she knows one side
is misrepresenting facts or law to the other side or to the mediator;
what authority a mediator or other third party neutral has to order
disclosure of information, and how information should be treated
when it is not otherwise discoverable (what I have called proprietary
"settlement facts"); what is appropriate for the mediator to do when
there are resource or other power differentials between the parties;
what role should the mediator play in designing, transmitting and
formalizing offers, solutions and agreement drafting; what account-
ability should the mediator feel for whatever agreement or solution
she presides over?
60. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1;
Menkel-Meadow, Silences of the Restatment; see also Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas ofMe-
diation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1 J. DIsP. RESOL. 1
(1994), reprinted in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 385 (1996); Leonard L.
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Ne utral La wyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329,
329-30 (1984) (proposing new standards and ethical obligations for mediators).
61. Examples of conflicts of interest include those that lawyer-mediators have with
current, past or potential future representational clients, as well as past, present or poten-
tial future mediation clients, and conflicts that lawyer-mediators have with imputation of
their conflicts to other members of their firm.
62. ADR practitioners face questions regarding the ethics of contingent fees and fee-
splitting with nonlawyers.
63. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-49 (1976) (applying
duty of psychologists to disclose "confidential" facts about a patient to prevent harm to a
third party).
64. See Edward Sherman, Court Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What
Forms of Participation Should be Required 46 SMU L. REV. 2079, 2089 (1993) (discussing
the "five frequently encountered forms of participation that may be required to comply
with court-ordered ADR: good faith participation; exchange of position papers and objective
information; minimum meaningful participation; participation with settlement authority;
and obligation to pay the third-party neutral's fee").
65. Clearly no current rule or legal standard requires such an undertaking, but courts
are beginning to subpoena mediators to testify about a variety of matters involving their
work. See, e.g., Carmen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that employee communications to a mediator were not protected from discovery by
an ombudsman privilege). But see Reginald Alleyne, Mediator Immunity, CHRON. J. OF
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB., Mar. 1989, 1 (mediator suggesting he will refuse to testify in order to
protect confidentiality as duty of mediator).
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, parties to these new non-
adversarial processes need some understanding of what the ground
rules are, where they can go to complain about perceived unfair or
corrupt processes, and what relation these processes have to more
formal legal processes. To the extent that legal ethics rules have been
justified by reference to professional function or legal institutions,
these newer, less adversarial processes must develop their animating
rationales and justifications to gain acceptability and legitimacy. If
non-adversarial processes are to offer better ways of solving human
and legal problems, then they must be able to demonstrate that they
have coherent ethics and standards of quality and professionalism to
those who would use these services. While many argue that the mar-
ket will adequately control and police here,66 a new field, coupled
with the complications of multiple disciplinary roots, presents enor-
mous information asymmetries to would-be users. To that end, ethi-
cists in these fields are now engaged in the complicated work of de-
veloping best practices and both aspirational and positivistic ethical
codes.
I want to close with a classic dilemma in legal ethics, one that has
been revisited every time we draft new rules of ethics: Should our
ethics codes be aspirational, seeking to express best practices and
suggested goals for how we can best do our work and often expressed
in grandiose, if inspirational, language? Or, do we need to regulate
for Holmes' bad(man) professional? 7 Must we make rules clear and
draft with an eye toward the lawyer who will use the rules in the
most technocratic way6 8 to avoid them and seek self-interest wher-
ever possible?
I leave you with two different formulations, which I have worked
on over the past few years. First is an aspirational code expressing
the ten most important responsibilities that I think lawyers should
undertake when acting in these new capacities. Second, appended to
this essay is a detailed and complex ethical rule, currently under
submission to the ABA's Ethics Commission 2000 on the possible re-
vision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and to the many
states enacting ethical rules for third party neutrals.69 I welcome
comments and reactions to these formulations. What I most wish to
express, however, is that although the ethical issues are difficult and
the analogies to the lawyer's role as adversary or advocate will not
66. See, e.g., Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 4.
67. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW (1968).
68. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues. Can Good Lawyers Be GoodEthical De-
liberators 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 885 (1996) (contrasting "technocratic" rule manipula-
tion of ethics rules with more discretionary and "sentimentally relevant ethical delibera-
tion).
69. This proposed Rule applies to lawyers acting as third party neutrals only-not to
others who may also engage in these activities.
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take us very far to resolve these problems, I do not want the complex-
ity of the ethical issues to prevent lawyers from engaging in these
new roles; they are difficult and unfamiliar to those with conven-
tional legal educations. 70 These new roles are our future-in our abil-
ity to find new ways to solve problems and meet human needs-and
these, it seems to me, are appropriate goals for our profession and
our human ethics.
II. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF APPROPRIATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: AN ASPIRATIONAL CODE
71
1. Lawyers should have an obligation to consider and inform
the client about the possible methods of resolving a dispute, planning
a transaction, or participating in legislative, administrative or other
processes that might best address the client's needs. Lawyers should
educate themselves and their clients about all available options for
handling the client's matter.
2. Lawyers should promptly communicate all proposals to re-
solve disputes by any process suggested by other parties, clients or
decision-makers.
3. Lawyers should consider and promptly communicate all
substantive proposals for dispute resolution or transactional agree-
ments to their clients, including both legally based remedies and
resolutions and those that address other needs or interests. Lawyers
should assist clients to consider non-legal concerns including social,
ethical, economic, psychological and moral implications of any possi-
ble solutions or proposals.
4. Lawyers should not misrepresent to or conceal from an-
other person, a relevant fact or legal principle (including opposing
counsel, parties, judicial officers, third party neutrals or other indi-
viduals who might rely on such statements).
5. Lawyers should not intentionally or recklessly deceive an-
other or refuse to answer material and relevant questions in repre-
senting clients.
70. Currently, several projects are underway to attempt to introduce more conflict
resolution and problem solving in legal education including the CPR Commission on Legal
Education and Problem Solving, funded by the Open Society Institute; the Missouri-
Columbia curriculum integration and dissemination project, funded by FIPSE; and an in-
terdisciplinary seminar on conflict resolution in the law school curriculum at Stanford,
funded by the Hewlett Foundation. As with all attempts to change legal education, only
outside funding seems to motivate legal educators to look at new subject matter and new
pedagogy, but that is a subject for another day!
71. These aspirational standards were developed through my work with the ABA Sec-
tion on Dispute Resolution, Ethics Sub-Committee; the Committee has not endorsed these
or any other formal formulations of ethics rules for the non-adversarial lawyer. The full
section of Dispute Resolution endorsed another set of standards, but these standards have
never been approved by the ABA's House of Delegates. See ABA/AAA/SPIDR, STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994).
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6. Lawyers as representatives should not agree to a resolution
of a problem or participation in a transaction that they have reason
to know will cause substantial injustice to the other party. In es-
sence, a lawyer should do no harm.
7. A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should decline to
approve or otherwise sanction an agreement achieved by parties
which the third party neutral has reason to know would effect an in-
justice on a party (or third party).
8. Lawyers serving as third party neutrals, such as arbitra-
tors and mediators, should disclose all reasons the parties might con-
sider relevant in determining if the neutrals have any bias, prejudice
or basis for not acting fairly and without improper interest in a mat-
ter.
9. Lawyers serving as client representatives or as third party
neutrals should fully explain to their clients and parties any and all
processes and procedures that will be used to facilitate solutions,
make claims, or plan transactions so parties can understand and
participate in the decision about what procedures to use.
10. Lawyers should treat all parties to a legal matter as they
would wish to be treated themselves and should consider the effects
of what they accomplish for their clients. In essence, lawyers should
respect a lawyers' golden rule.1
2
III. PROPOSED MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE
LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL
73
The Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, sponsored by
Georgetown University and CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution has
72. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Pa-
ternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764
(discussing the Golden Rule and its application in the lawyering context) (1990); see also
Leslie Griffin, Whose Duties and Liabilities to Third Parties?, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 1191,
1191 (1996) (arguing that lawyers should be treated as all others in the professional liabil-
ity context for liability to third parties).
73. The Model Rule of Professional Conduct for the Lawyer as Third Party Neutral
has been prepared by the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR,
sponsored by CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution and Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, with support from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The rule's reporters in-
clude Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University and Chair, CPR-
Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR, and Elizabeth Plapinger, Vice
President, CPR and Staff Director, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards
in ADR.
The Rule's drafters are members of the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and
Standards in ADR Drafting Committee. The committee is part of the CPR-Georgetown
Commission's Working Group on ADR and Law Practice. The Drafting Committee includes
the Honorable Jerome Simandle, the Honorable Edmund Spaeth, John Bickerman, Esq.,
Lawrence Fox, Esq., Duane Krohnke, Esq., Bruce Meyerson, Esq., Professor Nancy Rogers,
Elizabeth Plapinger. Esq. and Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow. Professor Geoffrey Haz-
ard served as a consultant and commentator for the group.
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drafted this proposed Model Rule for adoption into the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.14 We offer here a framework or architecture
for consideration by the appropriate bodies of the American Bar As-
sociation and any state agency or legislature charged with drafting
lawyer ethics rules. 75
The proposed Model Rule addresses the ethical responsibilities of
lawyers serving as third party neutrals in a variety of ADR fora (ar-
bitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, etc.). As an initial ju-
risdictional matter, the proposed Rule does not address the ethical
requirements of nonlawyers performing these duties76 or the ethical
duties of lawyers acting in ADR proceedings as representatives or
advocates."
74. Earlier efforts have produced suggestions for additions to the Model Rules regard-
ing ADR. See, e.g., Judith Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator
Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1991) (suggesting reform in the mediation
context); Robert A. Baruch-Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical
Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1 J. DIsP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1994) (reviewing ethical issues
facing mediators). The CPR-Georgetown effort attempts to remedy some of the inadequa-
cies of transdisciplinary ethical code drafting as well as the silences of current legal ethics
formulations. See, e.g., AAA/ABA/SPIDR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
(adopted in 1994 but not ratified to date by the ABA Board of Governors); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: La wyering as
Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631 (1997) (discussing the forthcoming
Restatement of Laws Governing Lawyer' failing attempt at dealing with ethical issues
raised by ADR practice).
75. The proposed Rule is in progress and the Drafting Committee welcomes all com-
ments to Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow at Georgetown University Law Center, 600
New Jersey Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001 (meadow@law.georgetown.edu) or Eliza-
beth Plapinger, Vice President, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 366 Madison Ave-
nue, New York, New York 10017 (eplapinger@cpradr.org).
76. The proposed Rule is designed for incorporation into lawyer ethical codes. The
question of what other agencies may promulgate transdisciplinary rules-such as the
AAA/ABA/SPIDR Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, or state statutes governing
all mediators, for example-is not addressed.
77. This rule attempts to regulate solely the ethical responsibilities of lawyers serving
as neutrals and does not deal with other issues such as the potentially different duties of
lawyers as representatives or advocates within ADR settings. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Mediation Representation: A Road Map of Critical Issues, DISp. RESOL. MAG.,
Winter 1997, at 3 (discussing whether a different set of ethical rules for lawyers involved
in the mediation context is necessary and desirable).
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RULE 4.5 THE LAWYER AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL 78
A. Preamble
As client representatives, public citizens and professionals com-
mitted to justice and fair and efficient legal process, lawyers should
help clients, and others needing legal assistance, pursue the most ef-
fective resolution of legal problems. This obligation should include
pursuing methods and outcomes that cause the least harm to all par-
ties, that resolve matters amicably where possible, and that promote
harmonious relations. Modern lawyers serve these values of justice,
fairness, efficiency and harmony as partisan representatives and as
third party neutrals.
This Rule applies to the lawyer who acts as a third party neutral
to help represented or unrepresented parties resolve disputes or ar-
range transactions among each other. When lawyers act in neutral,
non-representative capacities, they have different duties and obliga-
tions in the areas addressed by this Rule than lawyers acting in a
representative capacity. The current Model Rules are silent on law-
yer roles as third party neutrals, which are different from the repre-
sentational functions addressed by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and judicial functions governed by the Judicial Code of Con-
duct.79
Contemporary law practice involves lawyers in a variety of new
roles within the traditional boundaries of counselors, advocates and
advisors in the legal system. Now lawyers commonly serve as third
party neutrals, either as facilitators to settle disputes or plan trans-
actions, as in mediation, or as third party decision-makers, as in ar-
bitration. Such proceedings, including mediation, arbitration and
other hybrid forms of settlement or decision making, occur both as
adjuncts to the litigation process--either through a court referral or
court-based program, or by an agreement between the parties-and
outside litigation via private agreement. These proceedings are
78. The proposed Rule is numbered Rule 4.5 (contemplating an addition to the Model
Rules section on "Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients," in simple numerical or-
der). Ideally, 'The Lawyer as Third Party Neutral" would be a new Rule 4, renumerating
current rules.
Where possible, we use language, definitions, standards and formulations consistent
with the current Model Rules. We also take note, where pertinent, of the ongoing work of
the Ethics 2000 Commission of the American Bar Association, which is proposing revisions
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law
GoverningLawyers, ratified by the American Law Institute in May 1999.
79. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at
430 (indicating the different "foundational principles" in non-adversarial practice, such as
joint gain over individual gain, "future orientation" rather than "past orientation," thus il-
lustrating a need for a separate regulatory scheme).
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commonly known as "ADR" processes.80 Some state ethics codes,
statutes or court rules now require or strongly suggest that lawyers
have a duty to counsel their clients regarding ADR means."'
When lawyers serve as ADR neutrals they do not have partisan
clients, as contemplated in much of the Model Rules, rather, they
serve all of the parties. Lawyer neutrals do not represent parties, but
they have a duty to be fair to all participants in the process and to
fufill different obligations and responsibilities with respect to the
parties and process.82 Nor do the rules that apply to judges, such as
the Judicial Code of Conduct, adequately deal with many issues con-
fronting lawyer neutrals. For example, lawyers who act as third
party neutrals in one case may serve as representational counsel in
other matters and, thus, confront special conflicts of interest, ap-
pearance of impropriety, and confidentiality issues as they switch
roles.83 Unlike the judge or arbitrator who remains at arms length
from the parties and who usually hears information usually only
when both parties are present, mediators have different ethical is-
sues to contend with as they hear private, proprietary facts from both
sides, in caucuses and ex parte communications."
While there continues to be some controversy about whether serv-
ing as a mediator or arbitrator is the practice of law or may be cov-
ered by the ancillary practice Rule 5.7,85 it is clear that lawyers serv-
80. The term "ADR" is used here to connote "appropriate dispute resolution," suggest-
ing a choice of methods to be used to fit the matter. In more common parlance, ADR is used
to connote "alternative dispute resolution" processes, which are seen as alternatives to
more conventional trial or litigation methods.
81. See, e.g., Marshall Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client on
ADR Options? (discussion paper prepared for the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and
distributed at ABA Annual Meeting (1998)) (including listing of relevant statutes, court
rules and ethical provisions); COLORADO RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1;
GEORGIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE EC 7-5 (1996).
82. While the third party neutral does not represent or advocate for any of the parties
to an ADR proceeding, in some circumstances, the third party neutral may provide infor-
mation or advice to the parties without establishing a representational relationship. See
infra, notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text.
83. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995) (hold-
ing that if a mediator hears confidential information through the course of a mediation, he
may not represent a party in the same matter or one of substantial relation unless all par-
ties to the mediation proceedings consent after disclosure).
84. See Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995) (holding that a law
firm must be disqualified from a proceeding after hiring "the retired judge who had pre-
sided over the action and had received ex parte confidences from the opposing party in the
course of settlement proceedings"). The Judicial Code of Conduct may also need revision to
address new judicial roles in ADR, such as referral to ADR processes, ex parte communica-
tions with parties and third party neutrals, as well as judicial roles in settlement confer-
ences. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ex Parte Talks with Neutrals: ADR Hazards, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 109, 109 (1994); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ju-
dicial Referral to ADR: Issues & Problems Faced by Judges, 7 F.J.C. DIRECTIONS 8, 8
(1994).
85. In 1994, Professor Geoffrey Hazard opined that activities in ADR can be consid-
ered "ancillary" functions of the lawyer, under current Rule 5.7, making the Model Rules
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ing as third party neutrals need ethical guidance from the Model
Rules with respect to their dual roles as partisan representatives and
as neutrals. The drafters believe it is especially important to develop
clear ethical rules when the lawyer, commonly conceived of as a par-
tisan representative, takes on the different role of neutral problem
solver, facilitator or decision maker.
Lawyers may be disciplined for any violation of the Model Rules or
misconduct, regardless of whether they are formally found to be serv-
ing in lawyer-like roles. Accordingly, while other associations provide
guidance within specific contexts, 6 when lawyers serve as mediators
or arbitrators, their ethical duties and discipline under the Model
Rules ofProfessional Conduct may be implicated. For these reasons,
this proposed Rule is submitted to provide guidance for lawyers who
serve as third party neutrals and to advise judicial officers and state
discipline counsel who enforce lawyer ethical or disciplinary stan-
dards.8 7
B. Scope of the Proposed Model Rule
The proposed Model Rule is drafted to govern lawyers serving in
the full array of ADR neutral roles: as arbitrators, mediators, evalua-
tors, and in other hybrid processes. The Drafting Committee believes
that a general rule governing lawyers, serving in all third party neu-
tral roles is appropriate because the proposed Rule addresses core
ethical duties that apply to virtually all neutral roles. Where differ-
ent neutral roles give rise to different duties and obligations, the
proposed Rule so provides in text or comment.M A single rule is also
applicable to lawyers serving in ADR situations. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When ADR is
Ancillary to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Confront Conflics Issues, 12 ALTERNATIVES
TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 147 (1994). The Commission believes that subsequent analysis
and case law support the need for the new rule proposed here. See Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. at
863; see also Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1490-91 (D. Utah 1995);
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 407; Menkel-
Meadow, Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1, at 631.
For commentary on the debate over whether mediation constitutes the practice of law,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice ofLaw, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LITIG. 57 (1996); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate are Not Practicing Law, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74 (1996); Symposium, Is Mediation the Practice of
Law, NIDR Forum, June 1997; Geetha Ravindra, When Mediation Becomes the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 94 (1997); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, To the Editors: Is Mediation the Practice ofLaw?Redux, NIDR News, Nov.-Dec.
1997, Jan. 1998, at 2.
86. See, e.g., AAAIABA, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES (1977).
87. Whether third party neutrals will be liable in malpractice or on other legal
theories to parties to an ADR is a question of state law.
88. In facilitating dispute resolution and planning transactions, in a variety of ways,
neutrals may have different obligations with respect to various issues and within various
contexts. For example, where ex parte or caucus sessions are used, different issues sur-
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consistent with the generally trans-substantive approach of the
Model Rules. As the Mode) Rules recognize increasing diversity of
lawyer roles, separate rules for lawyers as mediators or arbitrators
may be appropriate in the future."'
The proposed Rule applies only to lawyers serving as third party
neutrals.90 Many other professionals now serve as arbitrators, media-
tors, conciliators, evaluators or ombuds, and other bodies have prom-
ulgated transdisciplinary ethical rules relating to those services.9'
When a lawyer serves as a third party neutral in a capacity governed
by multiple sets of ethical standards, the lawyer must note that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct govern his/her duties as a law-
yer neutral, and will govern the discipline of a third party neutral
who is a lawyer.92 The proposed Rule does not govern lawyers in their
capacities as representatives or advocates within ADR proceedings.
When a lawyer serves as an advocate, representative or counselor to
a party in an ADR proceeding, he or she is governed by such other
rules as are applicable to lawyer conduct, either before tribunals93 or
in relation to all other third parties.9
rounding confidentiality may arise. Further, multiple use of a single neutral by one party
may raise conflict of interest questions, depending on the neutral's role, the parties'
agreement and the relevant jurisdictional regulations. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4.
89. See MODEL RULES Rules 1.13 (Organization as Client), 2.1 (Lawyer as Advisor),
3.8, (Special Responsibilities of Lawyer as Prosecutor).
90. Also, the proposed Rule mainly governs issues of individual, ethical responsibility
rather than organizational duties. However, with respect to conflicts of interest, both indi-
vidual and organizational responsibilities are stated in the "imputation and screening"
rule. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
91. See, e.g., ABA/AAAISPIDR MODEL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS (1994); SPIDR,
ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986); ACADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS, MODEL
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION (1984).
92. This Rule distinguishes the lawyer's role as a neutral from the lawyer who may
serve as an "intermediary" under Model Rule 2.2 and who therefore, "represents" several
clients in an "intermediation" of their relationship such as a partnership, joint venture, or
in some cases, divorce proceedings. The American Bar Association's Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion is currently reviewing the Model Rules and developing proposals for revision. A cur-
rent Ethics Commission proposal calls for the elimination of Model Rule 2.2.
93. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3.
94. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.1. A joint initiative of the CPR-Georgetown Commission
and the ABA Dispute Resolution Section Ethics Committee is proposing amendments to
the text and comments of existing Model Rules to address these issues. Among the issues
being addressed by the Joint Initiative is the meaning and scope of the term "tribunal" in
the Model Rules. The term "tribunal" in the Model Rules has been interpreted to apply to
adjudicative or trial-type hearings, thereby arguably excluding facilitative-type processes.
The Joint Initiative drafters believe that the term should be clarified to include ADR pro-
ceedings which are not adjudicative but held pursuant to court rules and regulations,
whether proceedings are held within the courthouse or not.
The Joint Initiative, the Ethics 2000 Commission, and other groups are also considering
current proposals to redraft Model Rules 3.3 and 4.1 to include increased duties of candor
to tribunals, to clients and other third parties (such as in the rectification of fraud). In ad-
dition, rules that apply to the lawyer's role as counselor, Rules 2.1-2.3, for example, and
general rules of lawyer-client relations, such as confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6, might also
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The proposed Rule, where possible, uses the same language and
definitions of other lawyer and judicial standards, including formula-
tions from the Model Rules of Professional Conduc the Judicial
Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes,5 and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.96 As the preamble to the Model Rules states, these rules are
not to be used as liability standards for malpractice or other pur-
poses. On the other hand, the forthcoming Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers recognizes that ethical rules and standards are
often used for civil liability, as well as for discipline, and this pro-
posed Rule has been drafted accordingly.
C. Definitions
This Rule is intended to be applied to the duties and responsibili-
ties of lawyers who act as third party neutrals in the following proc-
esses:
1. Adjudicative
Arbitration - A procedure in which each party presents its posi-
tion and evidence before a single, neutral third party or a panel, who
is empowered to render a resolution of the matter between the par-
ties. Arbitrators may be chosen jointly by all parties, by contractual
arrangements, under court or other rules, and, in some cases, may be
chosen specifically by each side. Arbitrators chosen separately by
each party to a dispute may be considered "partisan" arbitrators or
"neutral" arbitrators, depending on the rules governing the arbitra-
tion. If the parties agree in advance or applicable law provides, the
award is binding and enforceable in the same manner as any con-
tractual obligation or under applicable statute (such as the Federal
need to be supplemented or amended to address different ethical responsibilities in differ-
ent settings. See, e.g., Ethics 2000 Commission Rules 1.6, 3.3. Some have also suggested
that the candor and good faith participation duties be heightened in some forms of ADR
proceedings. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Re-
quirement of Good Faith, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997, at 9 ("The rules and guidelines
appropriate for an adversarial, third party determined outcome, are, at best, inapplicable
to a participatory, interest-based mutual problem-solving process.").
95. AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1997);
These rules are currently being revised by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Convened by the Arbitration Committee, Section on
Dispute Resolution, American Bar Association.
96. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the American
Law Institute in May 1999. For commentary on the Reststements failure to address
lawyering issues raised by ADR practice, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences ofthe
Restatement, supra note 1; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Non-Silences of Professor Hazard on
"The Silences of the Restatement " A Response to Professor MenkelMeadow, 10 GEO. J. OF
LEGAL ETHICS 671 (1997).
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Arbitration Act or state equivalents). Agreements by the parties or
applicable law may provide rules for whether the award must be in
writing and what recourse the parties may have when the arbitration
is not binding.
2. Evaluative
Neutral Evaluation - A procedure in which a third party neutral
provides an assessment of the positions of the parties. In a neutral
evaluation process, lawyers and/or parties present summaries of the
facts, evidence, and legal principles applicable to their cases to a sin-
gle neutral or a panel of neutral evaluators who then provide(s) an
assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, and potential value of the
case to all sides. By agreement of the parties or by applicable law,
such evaluations are usually non-binding and offered to facilitate set-
tlement. By agreement of the parties or by applicable law or practice,
if the matter does not reach a settlement, the neutral evaluator may
also provide other services such as case-planning guidance, discovery
scheduling, or other settlement assistance. By agreement of the par-
ties or applicable law, the neutral evaluator(s) may issue fact-
finding, discovery, and other reports or recommendations.
Mediation -A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communications and negotiations among the parties to effect resolu-
tion of the matter by agreement of the parties. In some forms of me-
diation the third party neutral may engage in evaluative tasks, such
as providing legal information, helping parties and their counsel as-
sess likely outcomes, and inquiring into the legal and factual
strengths and weaknesses of the problems presented. By agreement
of the parties or applicable law, mediators may sometimes be called
on to act as evaluators or special discovery masters, or to perform
other third party neutral roles.
3. Facilitative
Mediation -A procedure in which a third party neutral facilitates
communication and negotiations among the parties to seek resolution
of issues between the parties. Mediation is non-binding and does not,
unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, authorize the third party
neutral to evaluate (see above), decide or otherwise offer a judgment
on the issues between the parties. If the mediation concludes in an
agreement, that agreement, if it meets otherwise applicable law con-
cerning the enforceability of contracts, is enforceable as a contractual
agreement. Where authorized by applicable law, mediation agree-
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ments achieved during pending litigation may be entered as court
judgments.
4. Hybrid Processes
Minitrial- A procedure in which parties and their counsel pre-
sent their matter, which may include evidence, legal arguments,
documents and other summaries of their case, before a neutral third
party and representatives of all parties, for the purpose of defining
issues, pursuing settlement negotiations, or otherwise sharing in-
formation. A neutral third party, usually at the parties' request, may
issue an advisory opinion, which is non-binding unless the parties
agree otherwise.
Med-arb - A procedure in which the parties initially seek media-
tion of their dispute before a third party neutral, but, if they reach
impasse, may convert the proceeding into an arbitration in which the
third party neutral renders an award. This process may also occur in
reverse, in which, during a contested arbitration proceeding, the par-
ties may agree to seek facilitation of a settlement (mediation) from
the third party neutral. In some cases, these third party neutral
functions may be divided between two separate individuals or panels
of individuals.
Other- Parties, by agreement, or pursuant to court rules and
regulations, may create and utilize other dispute resolution processes
before third party neutral(s) in order to facilitate settlement, manage
or plan discovery and other case issues, seek fact-finding or concilia-
tion services, improve communication, simplify or settle parts of
cases, arrange transactions or for other reasons. Such processes may
be decisional (adjudicative), facilitative or a hybrid of the two, and
they may be binding or non-binding as party agreements or court
rules or statutes provide.
Lawyers who provide neutral services as described above shall be
subject to the duties and obligations as specified below.
RULE 4.5.1 DILIGENCE AND COMPETENCE
(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should act diligently,
efficiently and promptly, subject to the standard of care owed the
parties as required by applicable law or contract.
(b) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral should decline to
serve in those matters in which the lawyer is not competent to serve.
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Comment
Diligence
[1] Like its equivalent in representational work (see Model Rule
1.3, discussing diligence in the lawyer-client relationship), this Rule
requires the ADR neutral to act diligently, efficiently and promptly,
subject to the duty of care owed the parties by applicable law or con-
tract. Other rules or specifications of timeliness and standards of
care may be specified in agreements of the parties, rules provided by
relevant organizations, or by applicable case law dealing with media-
tor or arbitrator civil liability. The standard of care to be applied to
the work of mediators and arbitrators is currently evolving in prac-
tice and case law.
[2] The lawyer neutral should commit the time necessary to
promote prompt resolution of the dispute and should not let other
matters interfere with the timely and efficient completion of the mat-
ter. If a lawyer neutral cannot meet the parties' expectations for
prompt, diligent, and efficient resolution of the dispute, the lawyer
neutral should decline to serve.
[31 While settlement or resolution is the goal of most ADR proc-
esses, the primary responsibility for the resolution of the dispute and
the shaping of a settlement in mediation and evaluation rests with
the parties. Accordingly, when serving in a facilitative or evaluative
process (see definitions), the lawyer neutral should not coerce or im-
properly influence a party to make a decision, to continue participat-
ing in the process, or to reach settlement or agreement.9 7
[4] When serving in an adjudicative or evaluative capacity, the
lawyer neutral should decide all matters justly, exercising independ-
ent judgment, without permitting outside pressure to affect the deci-
sion. The lawyer neutral serving in adjudicative or evaluative roles
should be guided by judicial standards of diligence and competence. 98
Competence
[5] A lawyer should decline appointment as a neutral when such
appointment is beyond the lawyer's competence. A lawyer neutral
97. See FLORIDA RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rule
10.031 (1998).
98. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B; AAAJABA CODE OF ETHICS
FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
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should serve "only in cases where the neutral has sufficient knowl-
edge [and skill] regarding the process and subject matter to be effec-
tive ."99
[6] In determining whether a lawyer neutral has the requisite
knowledge and skill to serve as neutral in a particular matter and
process, relevant factors may include: the parties' reasonable expec-
tations regarding the ADR process and the neutrars role, the proce-
dural and substantive complexity of the matter and process, the law-
yer neutral's general ADR experience and training, legal experience,
subject matter expertise, the preparation the lawyer neutral is able
to give to the matter, and the feasibility of employing experts or co-
neutrals with required substantive or process expertise. In many in-
stances, a lawyer neutral may accept a neutral assignment where the
requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable prepara-
tion.
RULE 4.5.2 CONFIDENTIALITY
(a) A lawyer serving as a third party neutral shall maintain the
confidentiality of all information acquired in the course of serving as
a third party neutral, unless the third party neutral is required or
permitted by law or agreement of all the parties to disclose or use
any otherwise confidential information.
(1) A third party neutral should discuss confidentiality rules
and requirements with the parties at the beginning of any proceeding
and obtain party consent with respect to any ex parte communication
or practice.
(2) As between the parties, the third party neutral shall
maintain confidentiality for all information disclosed to the third
party neutral in confidence by a party, unless the party agrees or
specifies otherwise.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
thereafter use information acquired in the ADR proceeding to the
disadvantage of any party to the ADR proceeding, except when the
information has become publicly known or the parties have agreed
otherwise or except when necessary under section (b), below, or to de-
fend the neutral from a charge of misconduct.
(b) A third party neutral may use or disclose confidential informa-
tion obtained during a proceeding when and to the extent the third
party believes necessary to prevent:
(1) death or serious bodily injury from occurring; or
99. SPIDR, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOCIETY
OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986).
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(2) substantial financial loss from occurring in the matter at
hand as the result of a crime or fraud that a party has committed or
intends to commit.
(c) Before using or disclosing information pursuant to section (b),
if not otherwise required to be disclosed, the third party neutral
must, if feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade the party's
counsel or the party, if the party is unrepresented, either not to act
or to warn those who might be harmed by the party's action.
Comment
[1] ADR confidentiality is distinctly different from lawyer-client
confidentiality, which is defeated when adverse parties reveal
information to each other or in the presence of a third party. The
extent of ADR confidentiality protections can be determined by
contract, court rules, statutes, or other professional norms or rules.
This Rule addresses the confidentiality responsibilities of the lawyer
neutral and delineates the neutral's duties to the parties, the
process, and the public.'"0
[2] Principles of confidentiality are given effect in the laws of evi-
dence (which govern evidentiary uses, restrictions and privileges)
and in ethics rules (which establish professional ethical obligations).
Privileges apply in judicial and other proceedings in which the law-
yer neutral may be called as a witness or otherwise required to pro-
duce evidence regarding an ADR process. The rule of confidentiality
in professional ethics applies in situations other than those where
evidence is sought from the lawyer neutral through compulsion of
law. This Rule is intended to provide the ADR neutral and parties
with confidentiality protections for ADR processes where privacy of
the process and unguarded, candid communications are central to
their use and effectiveness.
[3] Since there is no attorney-client relationship between parties
and lawyer neutrals, and because most disclosures of information in
most forms of ADR occur in the presence of the other party, the con-
fidentiality protection guaranteed to clients by their representational
lawyers by Model Rule 1.6 (as well as the evidentiary privilege of
attorney-client) does not apply in most ADR settings.
[4] The general rule that lawyers may divulge confidences to fa-
cilitate law practice within the firm is not applicable in ADR confi-
dentiality, especially mediation. "Since the essence of mediation is
100. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995); Cho v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995); Symposium, Confdentiality in Mediation,
DIsp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1999.
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the preservation of confidential communications, most lawyer-
mediators are scrupulous not to disclose such confidential informa-
tion to anyone, even attorneys in their own firm. Mediators may dis-
cuss fact patterns or mediation issues with other mediators within
the firm or the community of mediators. As a matter of routine, most
mediators will screen such comments to ensure that they never re-
veal names or confidential information." 
10
'
[5] This Rule imposes an ethical duty of confidentiality on the
ADR neutral to protect the ADR process and the parties. The rule's
confidentiality standards can be altered by agreement of all parties
or applicable law.
Many jurisdictions and courts provide confidentiality protections
to parties and ADR neutrals as a matter of law. While some statutes
are narrowly evidentiary in nature and govern only the use of infor-
mation in a court proceeding, other mediation confidentiality provi-
sions include both evidentiary restrictions and broader prohibitions
against disclosure. 0 2 Additionally, confidentiality is often provided by
contract among parties and neutrals in private forums.
0 3
[6] Since ADR confidentiality can be governed by different and
sometimes conflicting sources of law and ethical duties, it is impor-
tant that the parties and the neutral understand the extent and un-
certainties of the ADR confidentiality protections. Accordingly, sec-
tion (1) requires the third party neutral to discuss the applicable con-
fidentiality rules with the parties and counsel at the beginning of the
process.
Statutory or common law privileges, evidence codes, protective or-
ders issued by courts under discovery or other statutes, as well as
party contracts and court rules all can affect the scope of confidenti-
ality for the parties, the third party neutral and others outside of the
particular matter. 0 4 Some states, for example, require mediators to
disclose certain information, like the occurrence of child abuse or
domestic violence.' Additionally this Rule, like the ABA's Ethics
101. James E. McGuire, Conflicts in Subsequent Representation, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Spring 1996, at 4.
102. See NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1994) (noting that state legislatures have enacted over 200 mediation statutes);
ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1996) (noting that federal
district courts provide for confidentiality of ADR processes by local rule or court orders).
103. See, e.g., MODEL ADR PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES: MEDIATION PROCEDURE para.
9 (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution 1998) (containing confidentiality provision);
MODEL ADR PROCEDURE AND PRACTICES: CONFIDENTIALITY (CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution 1998).
104. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164 (1993).
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2000 Commission's proposed revision of Model Rule 1.6 and the
forthcoming Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, section
117, permits disclosure of information to prevent imminent bodily
harm or substantial financial loss. See Comment [10] below.
[7] In addition to advising the parties about the scope of confi-
dentiality protections under law and applicable agreement, section
(1) also requires the neutral to discuss and obtain party consent re-
garding the nature of ex parte communications, if any, contemplated
by the process. In some mediation processes, for example, parties
meet separately with the mediator and share information confiden-
tially. In arbitration processes, ex-parte communications with parti-
san arbitrators may be permitted under certain rules and prohibited
under others.106
[8] Given the extensive use in mediation of separate, ex parte
meetings or caucuses with the mediator, parties and their lawyers
may reveal information in caucus that is not to be disclosed to the
other party without permission. Section (2) establishes that the neu-
tral shall maintain the confidentiality of all information disclosed to
the third party in confidence, unless the party agrees or specifies
otherwise. In effect, all information revealed in confidence in ex-
parte sessions or through other confidential means, is to be consid-
ered confidential, absent a specific statement or agreement by the
party otherwise.
[9] Section (3) prohibits the neutral from using any information
acquired in the ADR proceeding to the disadvantage of any party,
subject to the exceptions stated in the rule. This formulation tracks
the current Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) for conflicts of interest for represen-
tational attorneys and former clients. Particularly in mediation or
other ADR fora where ex parte sessions are used, the third party
neutral may hear information or settlement facts that may not be le-
gally relevant but are highly sensitive or proprietary. Under this
rule, the lawyer neutral is prohibited from using this information in
subsequent neutral or representational work to the disadvantage of
the former ADR party.
[10] Like the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed version
of Model Rule 1.6 and the forthcoming Restatement of the Law Gov-
106. See, e.g., AAA/ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon VII.C(2) (1977) (permitting ex-parte communications between the non-neutral arbi-
trator and the party who appointed them); CPR RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED
ARBITRATION Rule 9.3 (1998) (prohibiting ex-parte communications with neutral or party-
appointed arbitrators).
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erningLawyers, section 117, this rule permits disclosure by the neu-
tral third party of information to prevent death or serious bodily
harm to anyone on the basis of any information learned, and disclo-
sure to prevent substantial financial loss from occurring in the mat-
ter at hand, as a result of a crime or fraud one of the parties has
committed or intends to commit. Several states, notably New Jersey
and Florida, require (not just permit) lawyers to reveal information
to prevent death or serious bodily harm, as well as to avoid some
criminal acts or fraud on the tribunal, even when learned in an oth-
erwise confidentially-protected situation.107
In many jurisdictions, third party neutrals are already under an
obligation to reveal such information under separate statutes or case
law.108
RULE 4.5.3 IMPARTIALITY
(a) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should be impar-
tial with respect to the issues and the parties in the matter.
(1) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should con-
duct all proceedings in an impartial, unbiased and evenhanded man-
ner, treating all parties with fairness and respect. If at any time the
lawyer is unable to conduct the process in an impartial manner, the
lawyer shall withdraw, unless prohibited from doing so by applicable
law.
(2) A lawyer serving in a third party neutral capacity should
not allow other matters to interfere with the lawyer's impartiality.
(3) When serving in an adjudicative capacity, the lawyer shall
decide all matters fairly, with impartiality, exercising independent
judgment and without any improper outside influence.
(b) A lawyer who serves as a third party neutral should:
(1) Disclose to the parties all circumstances, reasonably
known to the lawyer, why the lawyer might not be perceived to be
impartial. These circumstances include (I) any financial or personal
interest in the outcome; (II) any existing or past financial, business,
professional, family or social relationship with any of the parties, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any prior representation of any of the par-
ties, their counsel and witnesses, or service as an ADR neutral for
any of the parties; (III) any other source of bias or prejudice concern-
ing a person or institution which is likely to affect impartiality or
107. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
108. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11164 (1992) (requiring child abuse to be reported);
IDAHO RULES OF EVID. 507(4) (1998) (stating that child abuse discovered during mediation
is not a protected confidence); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 449-
50 (1976) (placing an affirmative duty on psychologist to inform patient's intended victim
of danger).
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which might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias;
and (IV) any other disclosures required of the lawyer by law or con-
tract.
(2) Conduct a reasonable inquiry and effort to determine if
any interests or biases described in section (b)(1) exist, and maintain
a continuing obligation to disclose any such interests or potential bi-
ases which may arise during the proceedings.
(3) Decline to participate as a third party neutral unless all
parties choose to retain the neutral, following all such disclosures,
unless contract or applicable law requires participation. If, however,
the lawyer believes that the matters disclosed would inhibit the law-
yer's impartiality, the lawyer should decline to proceed.
(c) All disclosures under section (b) extend to those of the lawyer,
members of his or her family, his or her current employer, partners
or business associates.
(d) After accepting appointment and while serving as a neutral, a
lawyer shall not enter into any financial, business, professional, fam-
ily or social relationship or acquire any financial or personal interest
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably cre-
ate the appearance of partiality or bias, without disclosure and con-
sent of all parties.
Comment
Impartiality
[1] Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias either by
word or action, and a commitment to serve the process and all par-
ties equally. Section (a) codifies established concepts of neutrality
and neutral conduct.
Disclosure
[2] Understanding that absolute neutrality is unobtainable even
under the best circumstances, this rule establishes a broad and con-
tinuing standard of disclosure by lawyer neutrals with the possibility
of waiver by the parties. The rule describes the circumstances which
should be disclosed in determining whether the neutral third party is
without impermissible partiality and bias to serve in the particular
matter. This form of disclosure is accepted practice in ADR proceed-
ings, including both arbitration and mediation.
A lawyer, as prospective neutral, should err on the side of disclo-
sure because it is better that the relationship or other matter be dis-
closed at the outset when the parties are free to reject the prospective
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neutral or to accept the person with knowledge of the relationship.0 9
While there is often disagreement over what may reasonably consti-
tute a potential conflict, the growing acceptance of the principle of
disclosure acts as some reassurance that potentially disadvantaged
parties will be given an opportunity to object or at least investigate
further.10 Conversely, it allows all parties to select a neutral after
full disclosure, where the parties knowingly decide to go forward.
[3] Where possible, best practices suggest that the disclosures
should be in writing, as should any subsequent waivers or consents.
While the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission revision of Model Rule 1.7
currently requires written disclosures of all representational conflicts
and waivers, this section advises, but does not require, the prepara-
tion of written disclosures and consents."'
[4] What constitutes reasonable inquiry and effort by the lawyer
neutral to uncover interests or relationships requiring disclosure de-
pends on the circumstances. Typically, in matters where the parties
are represented, this will involve the prospective lawyer neutral ob-
taining from the parties a complete identification of the parties, their
representatives, insurers, lawyers, witnesses and attendees at the
ADR proceeding and submitting the list to the prospective neutral's
conflicts system."2 We note that there may be a tension under the
law between the duty to disclose prior matters, clients, financial
holdings, etc., and the confidentiality required to be maintained with
respect to ongoing or concluded representations and ADR proceed-
ings.
The rule defines the scope of required disclosure to include imme-
diate family members, and business partners and associates as de-
fined in Model Rule 1.8 (i)." 3 It also follows Rule 1.10 and The Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers, section 203, for definitions
of business associations and law firm associations." 4 The rule does
not follow the Judicial Code of Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(d).
109. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52
(1968) (White, J., concurring).
110. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 MO. J. OF DiSP.
RESOL. 141 (1985).
111. Cf Calif. Arbitration Statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(a) (Deering 1998)
(recording the California Arbitration Statute and requiring all conflict disclosures in writ-
ing).
112. See AI-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission is currently considering changes to this Model
Rule of Professional Conduct.
114. The proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers was ratified by the
American Law Institute in May 1999.
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[5] Where a lawyer neutral volunteers to act as a neutral at the
request of a court, public agency or other group for a de minimis pe-
riod and pro bono publico, section (b)(2) recognizes that there may
not be opportunity for full inquiry, disclosure or disqualification chal-
lenge. In such circumstances, a third party neutral may have to pro-
ceed with the minimal inquiry and disclosure that may be reasonable
under the circumstances. If the lawyer, from memory, recognizes an
interest or relationship relevant to the case, the lawyer should iden-
tify that interest or relationship. Otherwise, the lawyer should dis-
close the general nature of the lawyer neutral's practice and affilia-
tions with law firms or other associations, or other known disqualify-
ing circumstances."'
[6] In general, parties may elect to retain a lawyer as neutral af-
ter the latter's disclosure of reasons why the lawyer reasonably
might be perceived not to be neutral. However, section (b)(3) imposes
on the lawyer neutral the obligation to decline to serve if the lawyer-
neutral believes that the matters disclosed, or other circumstances,
would inhibit the lawyer's impartiality or otherwise impugn the in-
tegrity of the process. In such instances, the lawyer neutral should
decline to serve even if the parties consent to the lawyer's retention
as a neutral.
[7] Section (d) tracks language from the Code of Ethics for Arbi-
trators in Commercial Disputes, currently under revision, and is in-
tended to prevent partiality from developing through the acquisition
of future business during the pendency of an ADR proceeding. The
parties may consent to waive this provision. The consent provision
may prevent difficulties for third party neutrals engaged to mediate
or arbitrate a number of disputes with the same party, either
through contractual appointment pre-dispute or through multiple,
simultaneous appointments or appointments during the pendency of
a particular case.
RULE 4.5.4 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
(a) Disqualification of Individual Third Party Neutrals
(1) A lawyer who is serving as a third party neutral shall not,
during the course of an ADR proceeding, seek to establish any finan-
cial, business, representational, neutral or personal relationship with
or acquire an interest in, any party, entity or counsel who is involved
in the matter in which the lawyer is participating as a neutral,
unless all parties consent after full disclosure.
115. See infra proposed Rule 4.5.4(b).
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(2) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent any party to the ADR proceeding (in which
the third party neutral served as neutral) in the same or a substan-
tially related matter, unless all parties consent after full disclosure.
(3) A lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not
subsequently represent a party adverse to a former ADR party where
the lawyer neutral has acquired information protected by confidenti-
ality under this Rule, without the consent of the former ADR party.
(4) Where the circumstances might reasonably create the ap-
pearance that the neutral had been influenced in the ADR process by
the anticipation or expectation of a subsequent relationship or inter-
est, a lawyer who has served as a third party neutral shall not sub-
sequently acquire an interest in, or represent, a party to the ADR
proceeding in a substantially unrelated matter for a period of one
year or other reasonable period of time under the circumstances,
unless all parties consent after full disclosure.
(b) Imputation of Conflicts to Affiliated Lawyers and Removing
Imputation
(1) If a lawyer is disqualified by section (a), no lawyer who is
affiliated with that lawyer may knowingly undertake or continue
representation in any substantially related or unrelated matter un-
less the personally disqualified lawyer is adequately screened from
any participation in the matter, is apportioned no fee from the mat-
ter and timely and adequate notice of the screening has been pro-
vided to all affected parties and tribunals, provided that no material
confidential information about any of the parties to the ADR proceed-
ing has been communicated by the personally disqualified lawyer to
the affiliated lawyer or that lawyer's firm.
(c) A lawyer selected as a partisan arbitrator of a party in a
multi-member arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently
representing that party, nor are any affiliated lawyers.
(d) If a lawyer serves as a neutral at the request of a court, public
agency or other group for a de minimis period and pro bono publico,
the firm with which the lawyer is associated is not subject to imputa-
tion under section (b).
Comment
Conflicts
[1] ADR conflicts policy, like all conflicts regulation, has two
main objectives: to protect the parties from actual harm suffered by
conflicts of interest, and to protect the process, the public, and the
parties from the "appearance" of improper influences. In the ADR
context, it is essential that conflicts rules protect against both actual
harm and the appearance of self-interest.
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Modern law practice is increasingly characterized by lawyer mo-
bility, both externally where lawyers move among law firms and or-
ganizations, and internally where lawyers on a case-by-case basis
move from representative to neutral roles within their law firms and
through association with other private or public organizations (such
as court or bar volunteer ADR programs). This Rule strives to protect
against both actual harm from lawyer role changes,1 6 and to protect
the ADR processes, the lawyer neutrals, the parties and the public
against the corrosive but less tangible "appearance of impropriety" or
"public" harms which threaten the integrity of these processes, the
neutrality of the lawyer neutrals, and the public's confidence in these
dispute resolution procedures. 7
[2] Section (a)(1) governs conflicts that may arise during the
pendency of an ADR process and is intended to be a bar against us-
ing the ADR process to obtain additional employment or other bene-
fit. Conflicts arising under this section can be consented to by all par-
ties after full disclosure.
[3] Section (a)(2) prohibits future representational roles by law-
yer neutrals in the same or substantially related matters, absent dis-
closure and consent by all parties. This section codifies the rule es-
tablished in Poly Software: "Where a mediator has received confiden-
tial information in the course of a mediation, that mediator should
not thereafter represent anyone in connection with the same or a
substantially factually related matter unless all parties to the media-
tion consent after disclosure." Poly Software, 880 F. Supp. at 1495.
We believe that the logic behind Poly Softwars prohibition of future
representational relationships in the same or substantially related
cases also applies to adjudicative processes such as arbitration. Ac-
cordingly, under this Rule, a neutral arbitrator is subject to the same
restrictions as a mediator, although a partisan arbitrator is excepted
from these restrictions by section (c).
116. See Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1494 (D. Utah 1995). The
court disqualified a lawyer-mediator from representing a litigant in a subsequent matter
related to an earlier case in which the mediator had received confidences from the parties.
See id.; see also Cho v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 863-64 (1995). The court dis-
qualified the law firm as counsel after the firm hired the retired judge who had previously
presided over the action and had participated in settlement conferences with the parties.
See id. The court also rejected the use of Rule 1.12 for screening of a former judge or arbi-
trator.
117. See Cho, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Although the firm had established a screening proc-
ess to shield the former judge from the case, and the judge stated that he had no recall of
the settlement conferences, the court stated that "no one could have confidence in the in-
tegrity of a legal process" where the former judge who received ex-parte revelations from
one of the parties joins the opposing counsel's law firm.
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[4] Conflicts may exist when lawyer neutrals, who have facili-
tated disputes and learned confidential and proprietary information
about the disputing parties, are asked to represent a party adverse to
a former ADR party. When trying to facilitate solutions, third party
neutrals may learn significant "settlement facts"-proprietary infor-
mation about entities or individuals learned within the neutral set-
ting that may not be legally relevant but that affect the possibility of
settlement."8 In this situation, the conflicts issue is whether an ADR
neutral who learned facts (e.g., about financial solvency, human rela-
tions, product development, acquisitions or entity future plans) dur-
ing the ADR would or could use those facts against the former ADR
party in the subsequent representation. Section (a)(3) addresses this
situation by prohibiting a lawyer neutral from representing a party
adverse to a former ADR party where the lawyer neutral has ac-
quired settlement facts or other information protected by this rule's
confidentiality provision, Rule 4.5.2, absent consent by the former
ADR party.
[5] Section (a)(4) addresses potential future representational or
other relationships between the lawyer neutral and a party to the
prior ADR in unrelated cases. The bar often refers to these relation-
ships as "downstream conflicts." This section is designed to protect
against the appearance or the actuality that. an expectation of a
beneficial future relationship or interest has influenced the neutral's
conduct in the preceding ADR process. The language in this section is
derived from Canon I.D. of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes (AAA-ABA, 1997) (currently under revision).,1 9
Imputation and Screening
[6] This rule follows the trend of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers to provide for screening of lawyer neutrals dis-
qualified under section (a) in unrelated or substantially related mat-
ters. This formulation continues to impute disqualification to the
whole firm for the same matter.20 This rule is premised, in part, on
118. See Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement, supra note 1.
119. This Rule provides for a presumptive one-year period of disqualification, but also
provides flexibility to shorten or lengthen the disqualification period, as circumstances re-
quire. Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prefer general and not time-based
rules, the Drafting Committee and consulting member Professor Geoffrey Hazard believe
that a presumptive one-year safe-harbor period is preferable to a general rule of reason-
ableness, given the substantial need among lawyers and law firms for a clearly defined
rule. Understanding that the time-based rule will not be appropriate in all circumstances,
a rule of reasonableness is also included.
120. See Cho v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (1995) (screening
not sufficient to defeat law firm's disqualification when the judge who heard the action and
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the different confidentiality obligations of third party neutrals and
lawyer representatives. Unlike lawyers representing clients, lawyer
neutrals generally should not share information with other lawyers
in their firm, and thus are particularly well suited for screening. See
Comment [4] to Rule 4.5.2, Confidentiality.
An alternative formulation, which the Drafting Committee re-
jected, would apply the current non-screen, imputation formulation
of Model Rule 1.10. This rule would read: "Unless all affected parties
consent after disclosure, in any matter where a lawyer would be dis-
qualified under section (a), the restrictions imposed therein also re-
strict all other lawyers who are affiliated with that lawyer under
Rule 1.10." We believe that a no-screen imputation rule is contrary to
the trend in the law, as noted above, and would inappropriately limit
the growth of mixed neutral and representational roles for lawyers,
with its attendant benefits to both the practice and the public.
[7] Screening in the ADR context involves the same actions as
screening in other contexts."'1 In addition, under the proposed Rule,
notice of the screening must be provided to all affected parties and
tribunals.
[8] Section (c) excepts partisan, party-appointed arbitrators from
the restrictions on future representational work under section (a),
and from imputation and screening under section (b). We note, how-
ever, the lack of consensus regarding the role and practices of parti-
san arbitrators, and suggest that if "partisan" arbitrators become
more like neutral arbitrators, section (c) will have to be amended.
[9] Section (d) excepts lawyer neutrals and their affiliated law-
yers from the imputation and screening rule when the lawyer neutral
volunteers his or her services at the request of a court, other public
agency, or institution and serves for a de minimis period.
presided over confidential, ex parte settlement conferences joined the opposing party's law
firm).
121. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.11 (a)(1) (permitting the law firm of a former gov-
ernment lawyer to undertake or continue representation in a matter in which the former
government lawyer participated personally and substantially if the lawyer is screened
from further participation in it, including receipt of fees from it). Annotated Model Rule
1.11 states: "An effective screen commonly includes the following factors: (1) the disquali-
fied lawyer does not participate in the matter, (2) the disqualified lawyer does not discuss
the matter with any member of the firm, (3) the disqualified lawyer represents through
sworn testimony that he or she had not imparted any confidential information to the firm,
(4) the disqualified lawyer does not have access to any files or documents relating to the
matter; and (5) the disqualified lawyer does not share in any of the fees from the matter."
See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 186 (3d ed. 1996).
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RULE 4.5.5 FEES
(a) Before or within a reasonable time after being retained as a
third party neutral, a lawyer should communicate to the parties, in
writing, the basis or rate and allocation of the fee for service, unless
the third party neutral is serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
(b) A third party neutral who withdraws from a case should re-
turn any unearned fee to the parties.
(c) A third party neutral who charges a fee dependent on the set-
tlement or other specific resolution of the matter should explain to
the parties that such an arrangement gives the third party neutral a
direct financial interest in settlement that may conflict with the par-
ties' possible interest in terminating the proceedings without reach-
ing settlement. The third party neutral should consider whether such
a fee arrangement creates an appearance or actuality of partiality,
inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 4.5.3.
Comment
[1] This rule requires a written communication specifying the
basis, rate and allocation of fees to all parties, unless the third party
neutral is serving in a no-fee or pro bono capacity.
[2] It has become relatively common to use contingent fee or bo-
nus compensation schemes to provide an incentive to participate in
ADR or to reward the achievement of an effective settlement. Section
(3) of the rule does not prohibit contingent fees (which some jurisdic-
tions or provider organizations do) but requires the third party neu-
tral to explain what the effects of such a fee arrangement may be, in-
cluding conflicts of interest. This rule imposes two obligations on the
neutral. The lawyer neutral is required to assess the possible con-
flicts attendant to use of contingent fees and whether the appearance
or actuality of partiality prohibits its use under Rule 4.5.3, Impartial-
ity. If use of the compensation arrangements is not prohibited under
that standard, the neutral is required to disclose the possible conse-
quences of this fee arrangement to the parties. Contingent fees have
not been totally prohibited by this rule because of their use in creat-
ing incentives for some parties to participate in mediation or other
settlement activities.
RuLE 4.5.6 FAIRNESS AND INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS
(a) The lawyer serving as third party neutral should make rea-
sonable efforts to determine that the ADR proceedings utilized are
explained to the parties and their counsel, and that the parties know-
ingly consent to the process being used and the neutral selected
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(unless applicable law or contract requires use of a particular process
or third party neutral).
(b) The third party neutral should not engage in any process or
procedure not consented to by the parties (unless required by appli-
cable law or contract).
(c) The third party neutral should use all reasonable efforts to
conduct the process with fairness to all parties. The third party neu-
tral should be especially diligent that parties who are not repre-
sented have adequate opportunities to be heard and involved in any
ADR proceedings.
(d) The third party neutral should make reasonable efforts to pre-
vent misconduct that would invalidate any settlement. The third
party neutral should also make reasonable efforts to determine that
the parties have reached agreement of their own volition and know-
ingly consent to any settlement.
Comment
[1] While ethical rules cannot guarantee the specific procedures
or fairness of a process, this rule is intended to require, third party
neutrals to be attentive to the basic values and goals informing fair
dispute resolution. These values include party autonomy; party
choice of process (to the extent permitted by law or contract); party
choice of and consent to the choice of the third party neutral (to the
extent permitted by law or contract); and fairness of the conduct of
the process itself. This Rule is concerned not only with specific harms
to particular participating parties but with the appearance of the in-
tegrity of the process to the public and other possible users of these
processes.1 12
122. The proposed Rule articulates a preferred rule of party choice and autonomy,
about the type of process (including whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative),
whether caucuses are to be used or not, and the selection of the neutral. This may not be
possible in situations where processes are mandated, either by contract (adhesion or freely
negotiated) or by court rules and requirements. The questions implicated in the fairness
and integrity of the process are very controversial at the present time (including legal chal-
lenges to compulsory arbitration clauses in some contracts) and thus, we (or the appropri-
ate ABA ethics body) might conclude that such a matter is too "substantive" or too unset-
tled for rule-making at this time.
As we write this, the case law is rapidly changing. The U. S. Supreme Court recently
held that an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement must clearly and un-
mistakably state that federal anti-discrimination claims are subject to arbitration. See
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). Similarly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has refused to enforce arbitration in several employment cases where the plaintiffs did
not knowingly agree to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims. See Duffield v. Richard-
son Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); see alsoRenteria v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d
756 (9th Cir. 1997).
The California Supreme Court also raised serious questions about the fairness and en-
forceability of Kaiser's contractual mandatory medical malpractice arbitration. See Engalla
v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997). Engalla has lead to a
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[2] This section requires third party neutrals to make reasonable
efforts to determine that the parties have reached an agreement of
their own volition, one that is not coerced. While some have sug-
gested that third party neutrals should bear some moral accountabil-
ity or legal responsibility for the agreements they help facilitate,
23
these Rules do not make the third party neutral the guarantor of a
fair or just result.
[3] This section of the Rule is designed to prevent harm not only
to parties engaged in dispute resolution processes, but to the appear-
ances presented to the general public of how legal processes are con-
ducted. Although this section of the Rule may suffer from the same
complaints about vagueness as the former Canon 9 "appearance of
impropriety" did under the old structure of the Model Code ofProfes-
sional Responsibility, the drafters believe that where lawyers
"switch" sides and roles, from partisan to neutral, it is important to
provide for basic criteria of fairness to be monitored in the process for
the acceptability and legitimacy of the process and the lawyers
within it.
comprehensive assessment and restructuring of the Kaiser arbitration process by outside
experts. See THE BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION,
THE KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT (January 5, 1998).
123. See Lawrence Susakind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Prob-
lem, 9 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981). The Kutak Commission rejected an earlier effort to prevent
lawyers from facilitating negotiated agreements that would be held unconscionable as a
matter of law. See MODEL RULES proposed Rule 4.3 (draft version 1980).
